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China’s Great Wall of Debt 
 
The figures of the Chinese debts are subject to ongoing discussion among economists. The 
question whether the enormous rise in Chinese corporate and private debt over the past 
decade will lead to another global financial crisis or will be managed by the Chinese 
government is one of vital importance to the global economy: if China’s debt management 
fails, the macroeconomic effects are expected to overshadow the catastrophic effects of the 
2008 financial and economic crises by large. The Economist (7 May 2016) even goes as far 
as to state the question not if, but when China’s debt bubble will burst. The term “China’s 
Great Wall of Debt” coined by Dinny McMahon (2018) to emphasize the connection between 
recent Chinese growth and corresponding debt seems therefore very well put. 
Approximating the real figures of Chinese debt is the starting point, from which any 
considerations regarding the expectations of possible effective government handling can 
begin. The validity of this study therefore is dependent on the reliability of its assumptions in 
respect of basic figures. Such are not easily required or chosen, since not only the 
International Monetary Fund continues to point out general shortcomings regarding the 
adequacy of the data provided by the Chinese authorities (IMF 2017: Stat. Iss. 11 f) but also 
international experts (e.g. Balding 2013: 23). A realistic estimation of debt levels for that 
reason has to rely on a variety of sources that in their combination may provide an 
approximation to the real figures. Even so, any convergence has to remain essentially an 
informed guess based on the most dependable sources available. The approach in this study 
is based for the most part on the figures provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). This 
combination of international and domestic figures promises results, which are not too 
lopsided in their emphasis and offer different perspectives as well. 
While figures regarding government and household debt levels relative to GDP are 
comparably easy to compose, acquiring estimations regarding the level of corporate debt 
proves rather difficult. This is not only due to the sustenance of many traditional state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs): The extensive and profound entanglement of the private and the public 
corporate sectors in China goes far beyond clearly designated institutions. This leads to 
uneasy and in many cases outright impossible differentiation between both sectors (IMF 
2017: 51-53). Relations among privately and publicly held corporations are manifold and 
extend to a wide array of significant factors, such as significant government influence on 
company decisions, far-reaching dirigiste steering of economic development and – maybe 
most important – the massive creation of local government spending vehicle companies. 
Starting with the Shanghai Municipal Construction Investment and Development General 
Company in 1992, other such firms were established and massively spread, especially in 
2008 (Clarke 13 f). 
Another factor most volatile might be the role played by the shadow banking institutions, 
whose extent in the recent months has been described by analysts as in full swing (The 
Telegraph 6 April 2016). This is due partially to the measures, which the Chinese 
government has implemented in order to curb the excessive lending by traditional banks that 
has been going on since years. Two thirds of lending from non-banks are considered to be 
“bank loans in disguise”, enabling to get around the formal and informal guidance as well as 
the lending restrictions regarding certain industries established by the government (The 
Economist Feb 2 2016). With China’s bank loans declining for the first time in the first quarter 
of 2017 under the influence of these restrictions, borrowers seem to have plugged the gap 
with shadow financing: Its contribution to the national economy should account for about 15.7 
percent of the country’s total corporate financing (Bloomberg April 18 2017).  
The following chapters will be constituted by a very brief summary of the events which lead 
to the ongoing rise in Chinese debts. This will be followed by an accounting of the total level 
of Chinese debt relative to GDP, partitioned to debt levels regarding government, household 
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and corporate sectors. The conclusion will focus on the financial sector, deal with the 
institution of shadow banking and provide a short outlook regarding the manageability of the 
totalled debt figures. 
China in “crisis mode”: What happened in the wake of 2008? 
 
Chinese growth has been the main driver of the global economy since the global financial 
crisis began roughly a decade ago. It is estimated, that China contributes 25-30 % to total 
global growth (Forbes October 30 2016). During the crisis, global trade nearly collapsed. This 
meant a huge decrease in China’s exports, a sector that had largely fuelled the country’s rise 
to a global economic superpower. As a result, many Chinese factories closed and millions of 
workers lost their jobs. The government, concerned that this spike in unemployment might 
lead to social unrest, announced the world’s largest stimulus package. China was in “crisis 
mode”, as Sebastian Heilmann (2015) has called this capability of swift and direct 
intervention. The $600 billion plan was generally tuned to encouraging a massive boost to 
public infrastructure building (ThomsonReuters 2018).  
The goal was to quickly create millions of jobs, ranging from construction to accounting. 
Typically, such a massive injection of cash into a country’s economy is funded directly 
through government fiscal spending. China however chose to fund the stimulus via loans 
from its state banking system. Local governments also borrowed heavily to promote major 
projects. But at the time most weren’t permitted to borrow directly from banks or to issue 
bonds, so they needed to find another way that would allow them to borrow. In order to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis, Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFV) were created 
by cities and provincial authorities to circumvent official limits on fundraising (Clarke 2016: 58 
f). These are in effect state-owned entities created in order to raise funds for local 
government development projects, such as real estate or infrastructure. They were able to 
take bank loans and issue bonds and it seems they did a good job: if China wouldn’t have 
proven overall resistant to the implications of the crisis, world GDP in 2009 would have 
decreased not only 0.1 but 1.3 percent (World Finance October 13 2017).  
The immense loan-financed infrastructure measures might backlash at crucial points of the 
Chinese economy: The IMF attributes to significant parts of total growth of the Chinese 
economy to being carried by public investments, which are financed by loans (IMF 2017: 31). 
SOEs are fostered by ever-new cheap credits, impelling them to produce far more goods 
than there is demand for: in July 2017, the Chinese steel industry produced 74 million tons – 
more than ever before (Business Insider August 24 2017) (fig. 1). The biggest concern is the 
rate at which China’s companies are borrowing. Since 2008, non-financial sector debt-to-
GDP has risen at extreme speed, approximating 250 percent in 2017 (fig. 2). 
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Encouraged by government calls to support economic growth, companies collected cheap 
credit. A report by Thomson Reuters mentions an estimation by Analysts that “two-thirds of 
corporate debt is in the hands of China's sprawling state-owned enterprises, many of which 
are unprofitable and inefficient” (Thomson Reuters 2018). Household incomes are impacted 
as well, since they have become increasingly tied to the real estate market. This sector 
threatens to implode, if many of the loans to finance housing and infrastructure prove to be 
nonperforming.  
While official numbers of non-performing loans at Chinese commercial banks total around 
1.5 trillion yuan,some analysts conclude the bad debt would be as much as 10 times higher 
than the official numbers, “because lenders use various methods to conceal the true figures” 
(Thomson Reuters 2018; Fitch Ratings 2016: September 22 2016). Even the official 
corporate debt in China soared to around 169 % of GDP in 2016 according to the Bank of 
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International Settlements, while the figure stood at about 100% in 2008 (BIS October 2016). 
Experts say the concern is that China’s debt has surged at the sort of pace that usually leads 
to a financial bust and economic slump (Thomson Reuters 2018).  
The IMF has revised its growth forecast to 6.7 percent for 2017. The organization expects 
China to average 6.4 percent growth between 2018 and 2021 (IMF 2017: 9). At the top of the 
IMF’s list of recommendations to make this growth more sustainable is working to tackle the 
debt issue: Going forward, the IMF sees China's non-financial sector debt to hit nearly 300 
percent of GDP by 2022, up from around 240 percent in 2016. The IMF warns, that debt was 
becoming less effective as a means of stimulating activity: The Guardian (August 15 2017) 
noted, “China needed three times as much credit in 2016 to achieve the same amount of 
growth as in 2008” . Credit to private households is rising rapidly as well (fig. 3). For that 
reason, President Xi Jinping has repeatedly urged to give „high priority“ to deleveraging and 
a more rigid course of intervention against firms, which are only kept alive by constant flow of 
new credits.  
 
 
 
Chinese government debt 
 
The World Economic Forum places China on rank 63 of 137 countries with an estimated 
government debt of about 46.2 percent (WEF 2018). But it seems that local government 
indebtedness is not being included in this figure. Decisive for any estimation of the Chinese 
central government’s debt therefore is the question how the debts of the regional authorities 
are dealt with. As parts of the whole state they are certainly to be included, but that raises the 
further problem how the LGFVs’ debts should be assessed.  
 
a) Local government debt 
 
It seems clear that there is no reliable way to make clear incisions regarding the levels of 
public and corporate debt in such cases; resulting from the fact that there is no adequate 
data available to make any such estimations and considering that the interrelations in 
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between public and corporate interests in employment, fields of action and debts of LGFVs 
are too intense to be reasonably divided. In August 2017, the IMF tried to account for these 
facts by introducing a model of „augmentation“ when dealing with LGFV debt, arguing „these 
obligations financed spending that appeared to be mostly non-market based with uncertain 
returns and by entities that are largely government-controlled“ (IMF 2017 22f). In 2004, after 
all, two thirds of LGFV debt (22 % of GDP then) was recognized as government obligations. 
Authorities‘ view on the problem is somewhat different, claiming LGFVs were standard firms 
and thus borrowing should be no part of the government sector (IMF 2017: 23). But such 
claims are difficult to believe in the context of the ongoing deleveraging campaign of 
president Xi Jinping.  
At the moment, local governments still sell state property in order to keep LGFVs in 
business, some of which are profitable while others are not. Government and local state 
bank financing therefore creates nonperforming loans that are prone to be endorsed into 
general state public responsibilities in the long term – while in the short term they are brought 
into asset management companies busy with debt conversion at least as long as speculative 
gain from investing into real estate remains high (Shih October 7 2016). Local governments 
theoretically even could become insolvent, if prices in the real estate industry should 
collapse. In that case, the general government would have to fill in. This situation might leave 
potential winnings for the local administration, while the central government ultimately carries 
the macroeconomic risks (still, in exchange for corresponding gains regarding economic 
growth and employment). But there are official voices that aspire to strengthen trust in the 
central governments’ ability to restrain further credit spreads: according to Huang Shouhong, 
director of the State Council Research Office, the idea that the central government will resort 
to bailouts when local governments suffer debt defaults would be an illusion (China Daily 
March 6). 
 
b) Central government debt 
 
As of yet, it is not possible to determine how the central government would react to local 
government insolvencies on a systemic level even if it now strives to stop the uncontrolled 
lending to LGFVs going on. Judging by these coherencies, it seems mandatory to employ an 
„augmented debt“ scenario as proposed by the IMF for the calculation of central government 
debt. This scenario adds other types of government borrowing, e. g. off-budget liabilities 
borrowed by LGFVs “via bank loans, bonds, trust loans and other funding options” to the 
central government debt and on-budget local government debt as identified by the authorities 
(IMF 2017: 51). Also included are government-guided funds and special construction funds, 
since they may be considered to be quasi-fiscal. Therefore government debt in an 
augmented scenario includes credit to LGFVs that is recognized as local government debt, 
while such that is not adds to the amount of corporate debt. In August 2017, the IMF 
estimated a figure of 68.1 percent of GDP (augmented government debt) for 2017 (fig. 4). 
The warning by IMF staff, that some nongovernment activity might be included and that 
some funds and LGFVs “may end up having substantial revenues” carries with it a slight hint 
on the broad scope and reasons for introducing the „augmented debt“ scenario in the first 
place (IMF 2017: 51). Yet even this definition of government debt may fall short, since it 
doesn’t include PPPs (Public Private Partnerships) due to lack of data.  
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While China uses the English-language abbreviation PPP, it defines the non-government 
partner as „social capital“ (shehui ziben) instead of „private capital“, which opens the door for 
state-run firms (CPPPC 2017). Particularly local governments in poorer regions, such as 
Guizhou and Yunnan, are rapidly building a pipeline of PPP projects (The Diplomat March 21 
2017). Ultimately, this may put new unmanageable burdens on local-level finances. Most 
PPP investments may then ultimately transpire as government debt, similar to those 
undertaken by LGFV‘s. Additionally, according to analysts at Fitch Ratings Ltd., Bank of 
America Corp. and Oxford Economics Ltd., about 55 percent of partners in the PPP projects 
seem to have turned out to be state-owned enterprises (Bloomberg February 22 2017). Still, 
this estimation was based on demonstration projects selected by the government to show 
how PPPs should work. Correspondingly, the analysis of a larger project database cited by 
Bank of America finds that state-owned companies are taking up 74 percent of the projects 
by value. A Bloomberg report notes, that more than “11,000 such projects totaling 13.5 trillion 
yuan ($2 trillion) had been registered as of end of 2016, Ministry of Finance data shows” 
(Bloomberg February 22 2017).  
Some private firms are getting involved, but according to surveys they often don’t have much 
confidence in cooperating with local governments. A survey by China Confidential finds, 
“More than half of the firms surveyed said that they were concerned about local governments 
not honoring agreements and were worried about a lack of enforcement of investors’ rights” 
(The Diplomat March 21 2017). State-owned companies on the other hand are less worried 
about low returns, “because they can borrow at rates as low as two to three percent from 
government-controlled PPP funds run by central and local authorities and policy banks” (The 
Diplomat March 21 2017). The IMF calculated the stock of approved PPP projects in end-
2016 at 3.2 trillion or 4.3 percent of GDP, while forecasts by UBS estimate RMB 4 trillion 
($580 billion) value of PPP’s being enacted in 2017 (The Diplomat March 21 2017). As long 
as these amalgamations of public and private interests are intact – and continuously 
supported by the Chinese government’s policies – a clear distinction between local and 
central governments’ debt remains impossible. The practice of Chinese PPP’s also insinuate 
that even on the level of single companies the ramifications of state control mechanisms 
remain considerable but opaque. This deliberate lack of transparency interferes with any 
comprehensive estimation of Chinese corporate debt as well.  
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Chinese corporate debt 
The IMF expects a non-financial corporate domestic debt of about 134.9 percent of GDP in 
2017 (IMF 2017: 43). To understand the contents of this figure, there are some relevant 
peculiarities of the Chinese corporate system that need to be assessed.  
In some aspects closely related to the LGFV business and financing system are the Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is estimated, that “China has approximately 150,000 
SOEs, of which around 50,000 are owned by the central government and the remainder by 
local governments” (export.gov July 25 2017). Of these, the central government controls and 
manages 97 strategic SOEs (so-called Yang-qi) through the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC 2018), of which 66 are listed on domestic or 
international stock exchanges. SOEs, both central and local, account for about 20 percent of 
China’s total employment and can be found in all sectors of the economy, ranging from 
tourism to heavy industries (export.gov July 25 2017). China’s leading SOEs receive 
substantial support from the government: they “benefit from preferential government policies 
aimed at developing stronger ‘national champions’, while enjoying “preferential access to 
credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt” (export.gov July 25 
2017). Correspondingly, SOEs also are not subjected to the same tax burdens as their 
private sector competitors. 
 
As it happens, SOE’s have been rated by the IMF to be structurally less efficient than the 
private sector, too (IMF 2017: 15). Partly due to higher exposure to overcapacity industries, 
partly driven by still significant social responsibilities and weak corporate governance, SOE‘s 
account for more than half of corporate debt and 50 percent of „zombie debt“ outstanding (i. 
e. old, forgotten debt coming back to haunt debtors) (fig.5 & 6). They additionally receive 
substantial implicit support estimated at about 3 percent of GDP, other benefits such as 
operating in protected markets excluded (IMF 2017: 15).  
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All of this happens in the context of exploding debt. With Chinese corporate debt soaring to 
around 169% of GDP in 2016, it reached roughly double the average of other economies, 
according to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS October 2016). Total non-financial 
sector debt rose to about 235 percent of GDP in 2016 and is projected to climb further to 
over 290 percent of GDP by 2022 (IMF 2017: 10). Although at the end of the first half of 2017 
corporate debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 165 percent, some analysts consider this to be more of a 
stabilization than a significant reduction (cnbc.com August 18 2017). Yukon Huang of the 
Carnegie Endowment’s Asia Program says, “China’s debt problems are largely due to the 
poor performance of a subset of SOEs. But because many of the largest SOEs are seen as 
China’s ‘national champions’, the necessary reforms have been delayed” (Carnegie 
Endowment October 11 2017). While such reforms are considered to be a top priority of the 
Chinese government and some results like governance and ownership reforms have already 
been implemented, the years after 2008 saw a change in trend towards continuing growth of 
SOEs, which threatens to crowd out private sector development (IMF 2017: 16). Chinese 
authorities claim it would be oversimplified to assess the value and efficiency of SOEs only 
by their financial returns, and it would not be fair to blame them for low efficiency while more 
consideration should be given to the social and policy responsibilities they have assumed 
(Jin Zhongxia July 18 2017). In addition, they argue that institutionalizing the Communist 
Party’s leadership within SOEs would help increase their efficiency. Xi Jinping (2017) also 
confirmed the importance of the state sector in his report at the 19th Party Congress in 
October 2017. 
The IMF on the other hand advised the Chinese authorities to “expedite implementation of 
their existing reform initiatives to foster competitive neutrality” (IMF 2017: 16). This would 
include moving SOEs’ social functions to the government budget to allow firms to focus on 
commercial objectives, raising the share of SOEs classified as “commercially competitive”, 
opening additional protected sectors to greater competition from private and foreign 
investment as well as restructuring of SOEs’ underperforming debt. According the IMF, the 
SOE reform agenda “should also be broadened to include hardening budget constraints by 
phasing out implicit subsidies on factor inputs and forcing non-viable firms to default and exit 
if market forces warrant, while providing fiscal support for the affected workers” (IMF 2017: 
16). Since competitive neutrality under state ownership may prove to be impossible in 
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practice, these reforms might also be complemented by transferring more state-owned 
assets into private ownership. Efforts to reduce overcapacity should also feature greater 
reliance on market forces and show more attention to underperforming debt (IMF 2017: 31) 
But such a proactive strategy in effect seeks to trade off short-term economic growth for 
larger longer-term gain, while strong economic growth remains an important argument for the 
credibility of the political leadership. For that reason, the central government’s growth 
incentive following the 2008 financial crisis has also to be seen in the context of ensuring 
political stability (fig. 7). 
 
In 2016, the Chinese government nevertheless seems to have started to take important initial 
steps in order to facilitate private sector deleveraging: guidelines were issued to broaden the 
number of tools that companies could use for debt restructuring. In addition a range of 
administrative measures were introduced to contain financial sector risks (IMF 2017: 20). In 
the run up to China’s 19th Party Congress in October 2017 therefore one of the key 
questions for most analysts was what kind of measures would be emphasized to deal with 
China’s corporate debt problem (Naughton 2018: 2 f). Feigenbaum and Ma conclude, the 
apparent problem would be the contradiction between a political mandate of constant, 
Chinese growth at about 6.5% a year through 2020 and the “deteriorating economic 
fundamentals that suggest achieving such a growth rate is impossible” (MacroPolo June 26 
2017). This discrepancy would account for ” internal confusion over whether growth or 
reforms should be the top priority, especially since reforms will almost certainly require 
tolerating near-term slowing and ultimately missing numerical growth targets” (MacroPolo 
June 26 2017; Shih October 7 2016). There are expectations that once the new leadership 
team is established, reforms will accelerate. But the likelihood of this actually happening 
depends on whether the new leadership resolves the major contradiction outlined in the 2013 
Third Plenum decision paper: This paper issued at the 2013 Meeting of the Communist’s 
Party Central Commitee asserts that the market should play the “decisive” role in resource 
allocation, but it also reaffirms that the state should continue to play the “leading role” in 
guiding the economy (CSIS March 2015: 2 f). That ambiguity seems to have clouded the 
formulation and implementation of important reforms, especially those targeting state-owned 
enterprises, urbanization, and corruption (USPAACC May 16 2017). 
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Nevertheless, a third of all corporate debt still seems to belong to private enterprises, derived 
from bank loans, bond offerings or shadow banking activities. A report by China Briefing 
argues, that many private companies in addition would have off-the-books agreements with 
their counterparts to guarantee loans: “With many companies having multiple agreements, 
this creates a chain of debt, significantly increasing each player’s exposure to the debt that 
has developed.”Therefore not only the indebted companies would be at risk from this 
situation but also the “sequence of companies that have acted as guarantors to loans and left 
such agreements off their balance sheets, thus avoiding scrutiny from auditors, regulators, 
and future lenders.” (ChinaBriefing May 12 2017) For that reason, otherwise seemingly 
unassociated companies in proximity to the compromised enterprises might also be dragged 
into the problem through bond and share sell offs. The ramifications of even occasional loan 
defaults might in that way prove to be far-reaching. Especially SOEs and LGFVs often seem 
to re-lend their cheaply obtained credit at higher rates (Shih October 7 2016). In the same 
way, many credits are being raised in order to be able to pay back preexisting ones. 
Optimistic estimations therefore assume a part of non-performing loans at about 10 percent, 
others like the Hongkong broker CLSA even of between 15 – 19 percent (CLSA May 20 
2016) The IMF estimates a figure of 15,5 percent of all corporate loans to be non-performing 
(IMF April 2015). 
In 2016, nearly half of China’s $226.5 billion worth of outbound foreign investments (stocks) 
was transacted by private companies. Companies like Wanda have acquired foreign 
companies like AMC Entertainment Holdings, Odeon & UCI Cinemas or Legendary 
Entertainment, while e.g. the Anbang Insurance Group was spending billions on the Waldorf 
Astoria New York hotel (New York Times February 22 2018). As a result, President Xi 
Jinping approved extensive banking regulations on the international acquisitions of private 
Chinese companies, concentrated on such big firms who had been enhancing their 
international portfolios in recent years: “The main targets were four companies who were 
responsible for a full 18% ($55 billion) of China’s foreign investments over the past two 
years: HNA Group, Anbang Insurance Group, Fosun International, and Wanda” — the last 
one being prohibited from taking out new loans from state-owned banks in the process 
(Forbes July 25 2017). This reaction of the Chinese government in opposition to so-called 
“irrational investments" illustrates that there are strong resemblances between many privately 
owned and state-owned companies: This is escpecially true when it comes to strategic 
decisions, governance issues, resource allocation and financing options. While China’s 
economic reality can facilitate the sharing of losses across other actors beyond the state – 
for example by way of selling assets of SOE’s in order to repay loans, if needed – it is also 
important to reckognize that it is quite impossible at least for big private companies to act 
without the consent of the government.  
It seems mandatory, therefore, that China takes further steps towards a credible decoupling 
of private and political economic interests. This may be considered to be a cultural issue in 
the first place, but it is also a matter of adapting to economic reality: In the long term, 
sustainable growth depends on entrepreneurial agilty and freedom from corruption as well as 
other restrictions that might come with a strongly steered economic development.  
 
Chinese household debt 
 
The rising wealth of urban residents, based upon an almost uninterrupted property boom, 
has resulted in an extreme rise in household debt. China's rate of private property ownership 
with over 89.68 percent of households owning an own house or apartment has grown to be 
among the highest in the world as a survey by Chengdu's Southwestern University of 
Finance and Economics reveals – and it has risen up from close to zero only two decades 
ago. For that reason, property has become an immense carrier of wealth in China: more than 
half of Chinese family wealth is held in the form of property, according to the Chinese 
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Academy of Social Sciences (SCMP August 6 2017). PBOC data shows, that consumer 
loans have grown accordingly: almost 50 percent since the start of last year, when the 
government began encouraging lending to households (New York Times September 25 
2017). And lending could even grow considerably higher: The IMF expects China’s 
household debt as a percentage of its economic output to double by 2022 compared with a 
decade before: Household “credit growth to the real economy remains rapid with the credit-
to-GDP ratio exceeding its historical trend by more than 25 percent of GDP” (IMF 2017: 40). 
In August 2017, the IMF estimated the household debt to be equivalent to 46.3 percent of 
GDP in 2017 (fig. 8). 
 
By value, home mortgages represent a majority of China’s new household loans adding to a 
surge in real estate prices. But car loans have been growing even faster in percentage terms 
and credit card debt is rising as well (New York Times September 25 2017). In absolute 
figures, consumer debt financed by Chinese banks has grown from 3.8 trillion yuan at the 
end of 2007 to 17.4 trillion yuan at the end of last year, a compound annual growth rate of 21 
percent, according to a report of Fitch Ratings (Thomson Reuters November 11 2016). 
Growth in income has reportedly been “much more modest, rising 6.3 percent in January to 
September compared with the year-earlier period, which is the weakest pace since 2013 
when the National Bureau of Statistics first started issuing the data” (Thomson Reuters 
November 11 2016). It‘s not surprising, then, that the rapid growth in outstanding consumer 
loan balances has been accompanied by an increase in non-performing loans across all 
segments of consumer debt. 
Regional governments across China began tightening restrictions on home purchases in 
2016, for example by “requiring would-be buyers to pay taxes and social insurance premiums 
in a locale for a certain amount of time before purchasing property there” (NikkeiAsian 
Review August 19 2017). Raising local interest rates aims to make buying more expensive 
and to contain excessive speculation while regulators directed banks to limit the issuance of 
home loans. Since March 2017, over forty cities have placed restrictions on home purchases, 
including restrictions from buying second homes in some areas. But these rules failed to root 
out real estate speculation effectively, and prices continue to surge in major cities such as 
Beijing and Shanghai at a pace which some analysts fear points to an inflating bubble 
(NikkeiAsian Review August 19 2017). Part of the reason might be that not all buyers face 
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the same barriers when borrowing becomes more expensive: Using mortgage rates as a 
means to rein in prices might exacerbate inequality between the rich paying all cash, and 
middle-class buyers who cannot purchase property without corresponding financing.  
Additionally, in many regions and cities restrictive policies are only reluctantly implemented. 
At the moment, the real estate industry is one of the most active and important growth 
engines (fig. 9). Even while prices are extremely overheated and properties are only avaible 
for absurd prices in the most of China‘s big cities: local governments and state banks rely on 
rising real estate prices in order to keep a continuous boom going and therefore render 
containment measures of the central government generally ineffective. In part, local 
governments routinely use their property to raise new credits in order to use them for 
infrastructure, hospitals, education or social welfare benefits (Shih October 7 2016). As long 
as prices for real estates rise, borrowing new credits remains acceptable – but if prices 
should decline, problems for everything the local governments finance will be close at hand. 
 
Ironically, the problem has some roots in another sector which has been extraordinarily 
prone to becoming massively indebted in the past. As discussed above, China’s state-
controlled banking system usually focuses on lending money to state-owned companies. 
Economists therefore view household lending as an appealing alternative to having banks 
give more money to unprofitable, “debt-ridden state firms that cannot be closed because they 
provide jobs to millions of workers” (New York Times September 25 2017). As authorities 
tried to alleviate the high levels of corporate indebtedness, short-term consumer debt has 
begun to surge and consumer lending has helped Chinese consumers “weather the gradual 
slowdown in the country’s economic growth in recent years” (New York Times September 25 
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2017). One example for that process is Qiqihar, a city of five million people in the province of 
Heilongjiang: The local economy was detrimented last year when a large steel mill partially 
closed and communal- and state-owned enterprises laid off more than 40,000 workers. But 
even in Qiqihar the city’s economy grew at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in the first half of 
2017.  
In the past, households‘ high savings rate has always acted as counterweight to highly 
indebted corporates and local governments. China’s 2017 gross savings rate of about 46 
percent of GDP seems to suggest little risk to the economy from the buildup in household 
debt at first glance. Analysts argue that household debt has therefore room to expand 
without representing a risk to the economy (Forbes April 26 2016). But there are hidden 
problems: “Down payments for new homes, which are relatively high in China, are often 
borrowed from family members” (Thomson Reuters November 11 2016). One therefore 
cannot simply assume that there isn’t any debt there; or since it is family debt it would never 
be foreclosed on lenders. The swelling amount of property loans ultimately begins to slowly 
change the balance of Chinese debt: “The net savings of Chinese households, defined as 
total outstanding deposits minus total outstanding loans, have stagnated or even begun to 
fall, showing that Chinese people are generally saving less and borrowing more”, a South 
China Morning Post report points out (SCMP August 6 2017). As a result, the stakes of 
avoiding a property bubble are growing as an increasing number of home buyers closely tie 
the real estate sector to the financial sector. This problem could become especially vital, 
since falling home prices could increase the number of non-performing loans as property 
owners find themselves unable to sell their homes or obtain additional loans to pay off 
existing debt. For some home buyers, monthly payments are already greater than their 
income, forcing them to borrow more in order to keep their homes (Forbes September 27 
2017). 
For these reasons, the IMF advised the Chinese authorities that a “change in the 
composition of fiscal policy to support rebalancing toward consumption and away from 
investment would allow faster consumption growth financed by a drawdown in household 
savings rather than higher debt” (IMF 2017: 11). Low consumption and high national savings 
would together translate into lower welfare for Chinese citizens and excessive investment 
and debt. Estimated at about 46 percent of GDP, China’s national savings in August 2017 
were 26 percentage points higher than the global average, mainly due to the household 
sector (IMF 2017: 13) (fig. 10). 
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Structural characteristics of the Chinese economy would be a part of the explanation for this, 
but so would be policy factors, comparatively weak social spending in particular (fig. 11). 
Especially lower-income households in China have to rely on a savings rate of plus 20–30 
percent compared to minus 20 percent in many peers (IMF 2017: 14). A move toward 
international norms on social assistance could help lower excessive precautionary savings 
and reduce income inequality, which is among the highest in the world with the Gini index 
rising from 0.3 in the 1980s to about 0.5 in 2010 (IMFb 2017: 9). And higher health and 
pension spending might increase private consumption indirectly by further reducing 
households’ need for precautionary savings: Public health insurance reaches nearly all of 
China’s 1.4 billion people, but its coverage is basic, leaving patients liable for about half of 
total healthcare spending (Thomson Reuters July 11 2016). While excessive savings prove 
difficult for macroeconomic stability in their own right – allocating a low share of income to 
consumption leads to lower standards of living – their broad substitution with debt may prove 
to have even devastating results.  
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Chinese financial debt 
 
At 310 percent of GDP, China’s banking sector is not only nearly three times the emerging 
market average but also above the advanced economy average (fig. 12). The IMF argues, 
that its growth in recent years “reflects both a rise in credit to the real economy and intra-
financial sector claims” (IMF 2017: 19). China's banks are also the most profitable in the 
world, thanks to regulated interest rates. The increases in size, complexity and 
interconnectedness of these exposures have resulted in rising risks showing itself 
prominently in the institution of shadow banking: It is a way for institutions to boost leverage 
and profits while avoiding regulatory hurdles such as capital and provisioning requirements 
on bank loans. According to the IMF, the key channels appear to be large banks lending to 
small banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in the largely short-term and 
collateralized wholesale market, banks or NBFIs investing in other banks’ negotiable 
certificates of deposit (NCDs) as well as banks and NBFIs investing in shadow products 
issued by other NBFIs (IMF 2017: 21).  
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About two-thirds of all lending in China by shadow banks appear to be "bank loans in 
disguise": A Bloomberg report notes that Bank lending jumped 10 percent in 2015, but over 
the same period investments known as Wealth Management Products, which is a 
speculative category of loans and other investments that banks keep off their balance 
sheets, rose a staggering 30 percent. Hidden lending on banks' balance sheets (which forms 
part of short-term investment) and off-balance sheets would add up to a total of 34.4 trillion 
yuan ($5.2 trillion), representing “more than five times the amount of subprime loans 
outstanding in the U.S. at the time of the 2008 financial crisis” (Bloomberg August 24 2016). 
At the time, financial institutions could evade regulatory limits regarding leverage, mortgages 
as well as other kinds of securitization by using special purpose vehicles. It therefore became 
conventional wisdom that regulators allowed extreme risks to build up in this part of the 
financial system, including the notion that regulators in the developed market economies 
have as a result taken action against on such activities (The Economist September 7 2013). 
The recovery of the shadow banking activity in the recent years in the face of seemingly 
strenghtened regulatory control may therefore come as a surprise. But shadow banking can 
still supplement or sometimes even replace the traditional banking sector by providing some 
useful functions: the creation of synthetic safe assets, the opportunity of regulatory arbitrage 
(especially when traditional banking activities are being constrained) and the reuse of 
collateral that is often associated with the set-up of lengthy collateral chains (Adrian 
September 14 2017). Regulatory arbitrage might be a problematic activity in its own right, but 
the other two major activities of the shadow banking sector can serve useful purposes in the 
context of a country’s financial structure. But that can only be warranted, if regulators are 
able to provide effective supervision ensuring the safety of traditional banks as well as capital 
markets by mitigating the risks that shadow banking implies for financial stability “due to 
lower safety margins and less regulation” (Gabrieli 2017:3).  
In China, however, It appears that shadow banking “is largely driven by regulatory arbitrage 
and attempts by regulated banks to avoid regulatory constraints” (Gabrieli 2017:4). 
Limitations by the government extend to bank deposits, lending rates and price competition 
in the banking sector. In that way, a strong government influence enables the Chinese state 
to guide credit toward specific sectors and individual recipients while effectively excluding 
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other would-be borrowers. Limitations such as these can however be circumvented by a 
range of instruments known as ”Wealth Management Products” that have been created by 
many Chinese financial institutions. These usually come with higher yields than traditional 
bank deposits and are able to provide credit for private sector borrowers as well (Gabrieli 
2017: 7). Through its avoidance of official interest rate restrictions, shadow banking may 
therefore enable not only a credit intermediation which is more intensely connected to market 
pricing signals than formal bank credit can be; lending to possibly politically eschewed 
borrowers should be considered as another important feature of shadow banking, too. But 
still Wealth Management Products, being off balance sheet financial vehicles, continue to 
create further uncertainty regarding credit quality. During the 2008 financial crisis, special 
purpose vehicles had to be brought onto the balances of many traditional banks, sometimes 
accompanied by devastating results, comprising events such as bank rescues. Experiences 
like these suggest a belief of Chinese investors “that the target return of these products is 
effectively guaranteed by any bank or Trust associated with the product” and ultimately by 
the Chinese government (Gabrieli 2017: 7). The risks of shadow banking financing for that 
reason may ultimately significantly impact the balances of the public sector as well.  
According to the IMF, these exposures raise several concerns: “When banks purchase 
investment products, the risk-weighting may be lower than in the case of regular loans even 
when the underlying assets are loan-like” (IMF 2017: 21). So although intra-financial sector 
credit may often be short-term and collateralized, these products could prove less easy to 
redeem in practice. NBFIs do not have official access to PBOC funding, while the price of the 
underlying assets could gap lower if large-scale liquidity stress should occur, thereby 
amplifying the resulting shock. The IMF notes, that the “numerous stages of leverage make 
“seeing-through” to the underlying asset more difficult for banks, regulators and investors”. 
Regulators should therefore coordinate necessary supervision effectively to ensure that 
financial conditions do not tighten to much, in order to make sure all solvent banks have 
equal access to the PBOC’s lending facilities as well as allowing insolvent financial 
institutions to exit (IMF 2017: 21).  
According to the Chinese government, the growth in the size and complexity of the financial 
sector is still manageable (IMF 2017: 22). Still, total bank assets grew by 16 percent only in 
2016. Smaller, unlisted and policy banks grew fastest and the expansion of bank assets 
seems to have been driven by claims on the government and NBFIs, accompanied by a 
steadily increasing reliance on wholesale markets to fund this asset growth (IMF 2017: 39). 
Concerns about underlying asset quality remain while the rapid credit growth feeds into a 
series of asset price booms, including bonds, stocks, and housing (fig. 13).  
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This shortage on safe assets might provide further tailwind for other credit spreads. Some 
analysts agree that such a growing shortage of deposits at a systemic level is worrying 
(Bloomberg February 27 2017). They can argue that a banking system of China's size should 
not become too reliant on financing from markets without far reaching ramifications, including 
impairment of the stability of the currency as well as overall growth and the very success of 
President Xi Jinping's corporate deleveraging campaign (Bloomberg September 8 2017). 
 
A discussion paper by the McKinsey Global Institute points out, that there are other perils 
ahead as well: noticing that the share of global corporate debt in the form of bonds has 
nearly doubled, the experts agree this is a positive trend, leading to a diversification of 
corporate financing (MGI June 2018: 2). In China, the share of bond financing in corporate 
debt alone seems to have risen from only 1 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2016, with 
issuance climbing from $33 billion in 2007 to almost $357 billion in 2017 (MGI June 2018: 6).  
But as interest rates on sovereign bonds fell to historical lows, investors’ interest in bonds 
with higher yields (and higher risks) appears to have grown globally. The correspondingly 
rising amount of high-yield bonds in need of refinancing could create problems in some 
sectors and especially among weak performers: in the coming years, a record amount of 
speculative-grade corporate bonds might need refinancing (MGI June 2018: 9 f). 
In China this process happens under unusual circumstances: While the value of China’s 
nonfinancial corporate bonds outstanding appear to have increased from $69 billion in 2007 
to $2 trillion by the end of 2017, the astounding amount of 95 percent of corporate bonds 
outstanding is denominated in the local currency. Therefore, generally less transparency on 
corporate financial performance meets with a multitude of corporate issuers who might 
already have fragile finances relative to the size of their individual debt-service payments. In 
a global context, default risks are mostly concentrated in smaller issuers. But according to 
the authors of the discussion paper, in China the share of bonds at higher risk of default 
(24 percent) is similar to the share of companies at higher risk of default (21 percent) (MGI 
June 2018: 17 f) 
Additionally, after ten years of low interest rates they currently appear to be heading upward 
at an unknown pace. While rising interest rates should not affect the ability of most 
companies to make interest payments, since many bonds offer fixed rates for the duration of 
the respective contract, it might make refinancing bonds more expensive for companies 
seeking to issue new bonds. This lowerage of the interest coverage ratio would then put 
more bonds at risk of default (MGI Juni 2018: 18-20). The corresponding MGI simulation 
proposes a 200-basis-point rise in rates, which would lead to a rise of the Chinese share of 
corporate bonds at higher risk of default to 43 percent, or $850 billion, up from $475 billion in 
2017. The authors note, however, that the central bank heavily influences interest rates and 
that the authorities might be careful to avoid any large rise in interest rates that could put 
such a considerable share of the corporate bond sector at risk (MGI Juni 2018: 20). 
Hidden lending and partially risky bond issuance as generally unavoidable ways to 
circumvent governmental restrictions play an important role in the functioning of the Chinese 
banking system. Their rapidly growing importance points to the fact that there is a 
considerable imbalance regarding the demand for new credit as well as its distribution. The 
general practice of re-labelling assets and generous lending off the books makes for a 
significant decrease of asset quality. If the Chinese debt bubble bursts, these claims might 
prove to be a consistently growing menace for the banking system which will only then reveal 
its extent by measure of its consequences. 
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Conclusion 
Given the high savings ratio, large foreign reserves and adequate capital the Chinese 
authorities claim to be confident that the financial risks presented in this paper are 
manageable (IMF 2017: 22). And indeed, in regard of liquidity Chinese banks superficially 
seem to be doing very well: At 67.3 percent, their median loan-to-deposit ratio is the lowest 
among major economies (Bloomberg August 24 2016). But the previously described intense 
shadow banking activities of many institutions create another picture: The Bank of Jinzhou 
Co. for example has a conservative loans-to-deposit ratio of 61 percent. But since it seems to 
have huge investments in shadow-banking products not marked as loans as well, deposits 
appear to be actually less than half of total assets (Bloomberg January 19 2017). Under the 
influence of the growing relevance of the shadow banking sector and the impossibility to 
control it effectively, risks for any reasonable estimation of asset quality remain high. Still, 
analysts of Standard & Poor’s pointed out that China has a number of tools at its disposal to 
deal with disruptions resulting from its debt levels (New York Times September 21 2017).  
Such include strong foreign exchange reserves, big net overseas investments and 
considerable trade surpluses with other nations. Therefore many spectators believe the 
worst-case scenario if Chinese debts implode would be a situation similar to that in Japan: 
Since most creditors are Chinese, almost all debt is held in China and for every yuan of debt 
there should exist a yuan of credit. While for example the US debt is substantially held 
abroad, China has only little liabilites in other countries (New York Times September 21 
2017). But like Japan, China might have to pay a high price anyway: the Japanese economy 
has suffered from stagnation and deflation for more than two decades by now and has great 
difficulty with breaking this effective cycle (Bluth 2017: 5 f). 
The large Chinese foreign exchange reserves also have always had a kind of soothing effect 
on economists as well as the Chinese authorities themselves. In China, the foreign exchange 
reserves could have been seen as a somewhat financial cushion for times of trouble. Three 
years ago, they were at nearly at an impressive $4 trillion. But in January 2017, China’s 
central bank announced that its foreign exchange reserves had slumped to $2.998 trillion 
(New York Times February 7 2017). When they were last at $3 trillion, in early 2011, China’s 
economy had still been growing at a much faster pace — and the central bank’s foreign-
exchange reserves were growing rapidly as well. Since the country’s economic growth has 
slowed considerably, companies and families send their money out of the country for 
investment or safekeeping. If the Chinese central bank didn’t react, according to the New 
York Times “the net outflow of money would cause the renminbi to weaken against the 
dollar”. The Chinese government appears to plan to stabilize the value of the renminbi in 
order to keep the money within its borders. China’s central bank has therefore “been 
spending billions of dollars from its reserves each month to prop up the renminbi and to slow 
its weakening” (New York Times February 7 2017). But if the renminbi were to start to 
dwindle sharply, many families and companies may choose to move their money out of 
China to minimize their losses.  
The dwindling reserves may therefore reveal some concerning truths about the direction the 
Chinese economy is about to take. The interaction of local and central government when it 
comes to utilizing debt to avoid crises as well as to gain or keep political momentum in terms 
of growth and occupation has to be characterized as short-sighted, as long as these 
practices still prevail. While it could be said with some consideration that resorting to loans to 
avoid imminent crisis in 2008 might have been a rewarding course, at the end of 2017 it 
seems that the steep rise of debt since then has made a lasting, negative impact on the 
Chinese economy. The control of credit availability by different levels of the government 
whilst massively investing in infrastructure and housing by way of LGFVs has laid the 
groundwork of a bubble the impending burst of which might by far exceed the negative 
outcomes of the one avoided ten years ago.  
Competitive neutrality may be one way out of the vicious circle of low company performance 
and the taking up of cheap loans. This would have to be accompanied by a credible 
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decoupling of private and political economic interests, enabling entrepreneurial freedom as 
well as the necessity for SOE’s and LGFV’s to prove on the market. That, of course, should 
be linked to a broader and more comprising social net that can balance the effects of state-
owned enterprises’ social functions on a societal scale. Being in a structural change from a 
production-oriented economic model towards a more service-oriented one, China needs to 
balance old sinecures against the requirements of a more modern system that depends 
heavily on consumption (fig. 14; 15).  
 
 
The extraordinarily high Chinese savings rate is shrinking but savings still have to serve as a 
social security since there are no sufficient social safety, pension and health nets available 
for large parts of the population. This lack of governmental social spending creates a 
paradox situation in which rising consumer debts and excessive savings continue to coexist. 
A considerable strengthening of citizens’ social securities would very likely lead to a boost of 
sustainable consumption while significantly containing the further rise of consumer debt (IMF 
2017: 14). Increasingly, the shadow banking industry provides possibilities to circumvent 
higher restrictions on lending enacted by the central and city governments. In that way, 
hidden lending poses a continuously growing threat to the functioning of the Chinese banking 
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system that might only be rectified by a far-reaching devaluation of the Renminbi, as Victor 
Shih (October 7 2016) proposes. The ongoing erosion of asset quality happening mainly off 
the books could very possibly create a situation, which might compromise the stability of the 
banking system as a whole. The possibility that the Chinese banking system may become 
overly reliant on market financing in the course of avoiding regulatory restrictions is fueled in 
part by a constantly overheating real estate market. It seems that one source of this boom 
appearing on a private and corporate level remains the intense relation between political 
stability and constantly high growth figures (Shih October 7 2017). 
As long as China’s macroeconomic policy stays focused on a growth under all circumstances 
it will continue to evade the fact that a lot of the country’s debt is bad debt and ultimately 
should be written down (Shih October 7 2016). If this doesn’t happen, the estimation of an 
overall 249.3 percent of GDP total domestic non-financial sector debt at the end of 2017 as 
presented in this paper could very well extend further: the IMF sees China's non-financial 
sector debt to hit nearly 300 percent of GDP by 2022 (IMF 2017: 10) (fig. 16).  
The repercussions of a failure of the Chinese government to appropriately address the 
multitude of problems feeding into this growing debt bubble could be unprecedented. They 
seem to pit the political stability connected with stabile growth against the macroeconomic 
realities of a global world. With its LGFV funding program, China bought time to delay the 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis. It is still open, if the Chinese central government will be 
able to effectively restrain the lending spree of local governments and thereby take the risks 
of a political situation in which economic success might happen without guarantees. If it fails 
to do so, it might be dangerous for the global economy to further depend on the growth of a 
country where economic rules would then continue to be made up rather than followed. 
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